"But if the EU might well qualify [como legitimada democraticamente] by liberal standards, it would definitely fail by the criteria of republican democracy. On the output side, the Union's capacity to promote the common good is constrained by the extremely high consensus requerirements of EU legislation. They prevent effective collective action in response to many problems that member states could not deal with nationally. The notorious inability to regulate competition over taxes on company profits and capital incomes is just one example.
(...)
The constraints of consensual decision making cannot be significantly relaxed as long as the peoples of twenty-seven member states lack a collective identity that could legitimate Europe-wide majority rule. And even if citizens were to develop a sense of common solidarity and a stronger attachment to the European polity than to their own nation state (perhaps in response to external challenges from American, Russia, or China), they would presently lack all the societal and institucional prerequisites of input-oriented democracy: no Europe-wide media of communication and political debates, no Europe-wide political parties, no Europe-wide party competition focused on highly salient European policy choices, and no politically accountable European government that must antecipate and respond to the egalitarian control of Europe-wide election returns. There is no theoretical reason to think that these deficits should be written in stone. But at present, input-oriented republican legitimacy cannot be claimed for the Union.
While these stylised diagnoses may be somewhat overdrawn, they suggest a prima facie plausible interpretation of current disputes over the existence of a "European democratic deficit".
Fritz W. Scharpf, "Legitimacy in the Multi-level European Polity", in Petra Dobner/Martin Laughlin (eds.), The Twilight of Constitutionalism?, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 94 e 95.
(...)
The constraints of consensual decision making cannot be significantly relaxed as long as the peoples of twenty-seven member states lack a collective identity that could legitimate Europe-wide majority rule. And even if citizens were to develop a sense of common solidarity and a stronger attachment to the European polity than to their own nation state (perhaps in response to external challenges from American, Russia, or China), they would presently lack all the societal and institucional prerequisites of input-oriented democracy: no Europe-wide media of communication and political debates, no Europe-wide political parties, no Europe-wide party competition focused on highly salient European policy choices, and no politically accountable European government that must antecipate and respond to the egalitarian control of Europe-wide election returns. There is no theoretical reason to think that these deficits should be written in stone. But at present, input-oriented republican legitimacy cannot be claimed for the Union.
While these stylised diagnoses may be somewhat overdrawn, they suggest a prima facie plausible interpretation of current disputes over the existence of a "European democratic deficit".
Fritz W. Scharpf, "Legitimacy in the Multi-level European Polity", in Petra Dobner/Martin Laughlin (eds.), The Twilight of Constitutionalism?, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 94 e 95.
Chicão,marca mazé o jantar de natal senão vou te partir os dedos e não há mais blog :b
ResponderEliminarAbraço
D